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this concrete primary science to the secondary deductive science of mathematical logic or logistic. The subject of the present paper, then, is a meta-logical one. If it succeeds merely in putting the question its purpose will have been accomplished.

When the mathematical logician boasts that his science is one which studies the properties of defined things similar to those which occur in the thinking process but not having any necessary connection with them, he seems to me to talk like a man whose life is dedicated to the study of the Phoenix or the Basilisk. Perhaps I misunderstand; and this paper, after all, is only a plea for enlightenment. James Stuart Mill said that genius is the ability to perceive remote connections and gave basis for an excellent definition of philosophy—as *the study of relevance and of purport*. If logistic is really a part of philosophy, it would seem that the logicians might give us a discussion of the relevance of mathematical logic. The significance of a symbolistic shorthand representation of a train of thinking is plain enough. What of the volumes of theorems derived by developing the defined properties of symbols? What of this science that C. I. Lewis has shown to be only a game, played according to rules, with quids and with quods? Strong language puts the question forcefully. And a discussion of it by the logicians would be a contribution to meta-logic.

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SOCIETIES

THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE WESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

WITH its annual meeting, on April 16 and 17, at the University of Wisconsin, the Western Philosophical Association brought to a strikingly successful close the twentieth year of its history. The attendance, including instructors, assistants, and graduate students from neighboring institutions, was the largest in years; the discussion was thoroughly fresh and lively and the fellowship both genuine and spirited. The pleasure and the profit of the meetings were both enhanced in no small measure through the thoughtful arrangements made by the local department of philosophy and through the kindness of the Beta Theta Pi fraternity in placing its Lodge at the disposal of the visiting members, thus enabling them to live in common during their stay in Madison.

Under the new name of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, and in eager cooperation with the Eastern Division, the organization now seeks a further expansion of its usefulness. The possibilities inherent in joint undertakings were promisingly augured in the business meeting. Following a resolution by which a committee was instructed to cooperate with a committee of the Eastern Division in arranging for a joint meeting which, with invitations to other American and to foreign philosophical societies, might possibly be given the character of a philosophical congress, the announcement was made that Mrs. Carus had generously made the offer of an honorarium, in memory of Dr. Paul Carus, for a course of lectures to be given on the occasion of the first joint meeting of the Divisions.

The presidential address by Professor Norman Wilde was delivered immediately after the annual dinner on Friday evening. Selecting as his topic, "The Attack on the State," President Wilde presented a critique, both acute and constructive, of recent pluralistic theories, and a defense of the view that political sovereignty must be interpreted as very genuinely supreme and unitary.

A noteworthy feature of the meeting was the informal session or gathering held on Saturday afternoon in the living room of the Beta Theta Pi Lodge. Various matters of common interest were considered. The greater part of the afternoon, however, was taken up by discussions of various attempts now being made or projected by American colleges and universities to provide students with a twentieth century *Weltanschauung*, with an intelligent view of the physical and the social environment in which modern life is carried on, or with such knowledge as forms an indispensable prerequisite for any serious study of metaphysics. The discussion was initiated by a paper which Professor Gregory D. Walcott presented on "A New Content Course in Philosophy."¹ The aim of the course which Professor Walcott described and which he is this year giving in Hamline University is to furnish a cross-sectional view of the world as this is represented by the various sciences of to-day. Through the series of books published by Henry Holt & Company as "The Home University Library of Modern Knowledge," the students are introduced to some fifteen or twenty sciences in the course of the year. Only the more general and important points are stressed, and these are brought into as complete and vital relations as possible, the whole constituting a sort of neo-Positivistic or neo-Synthetic evolutionary philosophy. For next year Professor Walcott is planning a companion course on "A Philosophical Survey of Human Culture."

¹ To be published in full in a later issue of this JOURNAL.

The most significant item of business transacted was the adoption, with certain minor changes, of a report presented by Professor Alexander, Chairman of the Committee on the Federation of Philosophical Associations. As amended and adopted, the report reads as follows:

"The Committee of the Western Philosophical Association, continued for the purpose of carrying forward negotiations looking to the federation of this Association with the American and the Southern Philosophical Associations, report as follows:

"1. While some members of the Southern Philosophical Association have indicated interest in the proposals made, no definite response has as yet been received.

"2. At the meeting of the American Philosophical Association held in Ithaca, December 30 and 31, 1919, the following amendment to Article I., Section 1, of its constitution, was unanimously passed:

" 'The name of this organization shall be the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association.'

"Further, it was moved and carried that the matter of closer association between the Eastern, Western and Southern Associations be referred to the Committee on Organization and Attendance (Professor Tufts, chairman); and it was suggested that in choosing a place of meeting for next year (1920) a joint meeting with the Western branch be considered.

"3. In view of the action of the American Philosophical Association, this committee recommends the following amendment and resolution:

"I. The name of this association shall be the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association.

"II. The members of this Association, in changing its name, express their cordial appreciation of the courtesy of the members of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, and the hope that the change of name may be the foretoken of a more intimate association of the memberships of the two Divisions.

"4. The committee further recommend:

"(a) That the matter of securing a joint meeting be continued with a committee appointed for this purpose, to act in consultation with the committee similarly empowered by the Eastern Division.

"(b) That the members of the Western Division express their hope that the first joint meeting, or congress, may be arranged to be held in the first or second week of September, 1921, on the campus of some university of the eastern states.

"(c) That the Western Division believe that the joint meeting should be made the occasion for the extending of an invitation to

some American philosopher to deliver there a series of not less than five lectures upon some philosophical topic, the lecturer to be chosen by the committee organizing the programme.

“(d) That they also suggest the desirability of inviting the presence of delegates from other philosophical societies, American or foreign, thus giving the meeting the character of a philosophical congress.”

The existing committee on Federation was appointed as the committee mentioned in paragraph four of the above report. In response to a letter from President Perry, of the Eastern Division, the secretary was authorized to communicate to Professor Armstrong, chairman of a committee of the Eastern Division having in charge matters relating to the sending of representatives to the approaching international philosophical gathering at Oxford, our desire that the representatives selected bear the credentials of the Western Division as well. In acceptance of an invitation from the University of Chicago, it was resolved to hold the next annual meeting of the Division at that institution. The generous offer by Mrs. Paul Carus of a honorarium, in memory of Dr. Paul Carus, for a course of lectures to be given at the first joint meeting with the Eastern Division, was enthusiastically accepted and the secretary was instructed to convey to Mrs. Carus the deep appreciation of the Division. Resolutions of thanks were offered also to the University of Wisconsin, its Department of Philosophy, and the local Beta Theta Pi fraternity for their splendid hospitality to the members and visiting friends of the Association.

The following persons were elected to membership in the Division: Albert R. Chandler, H. E. Cunningham, D. S. Robinson, A. J. Schneeweiss, Ella Stokes, and W. C. Swabey.

The officers elected for the coming year were: *President*, E. L. Hinman; *Vice-president*, W. L. Raub; *Secretary-Treasurer*, E. L. Schaub; *Members of the Executive Committee*, R. C. Lodge, A. W. Moore, M. C. Otto, J. D. Stoops.

The treasurer's report indicated the possession of forty war savings stamps, in addition to balances in the checking and in the savings accounts, respectively, of \$82.94 and \$69.44.

The papers read at the meeting were as follows:

The Logical Status of Elementary and Reflective Judgments: R. C. LODGE.

(Published in full in this JOURNAL, Vol. XVII., pp. 214-220.)

Some Lingering Misconceptions of Instrumentalism: A. W. MOORE.

The justification of a discussion under this heading is found in

the fact that recent important literature revives certain misconceptions of instrumentalism, which a year ago one would have said had been finally disposed of. These misconceptions arise from unauthorized extensions of the meaning of the term "instrumental." In all authorized versions of instrumentalism the term refers to the instrumental character of *reflective*, inferential consciousness. In the misconceptions it is made to apply to *all* consciousness with the result that *immediate* experience to which reflection is instrumental is reduced to mere physical motion, and when applied to values the misconceptions result in the absurdity, which the perpetrator of the misconstruction delights to point out, of making all values instrumental to a process which is devoid of value.

References to repeated explicit statements by instrumentalists of what they mean by "immediate experience" show how unwarranted this misuse of the term instrumental is and how grotesque the notion that instrumentalism has no place for the values of appreciation, contemplation and adoration which are precisely the things to which, in instrumental doctrine, *reflective* consciousness is instrumental.

Some of the sources of the misconceptions are : (1) The term "instrumentalism" which as an "ism" is, with some justification, taken to mean a universal character; (2) the habit common to all of us of thinking and talking of consciousness in *cognitive* terms; (3) failure to note that the biology to which instrumentalists appeal is a glorified biology loaded with all the conscious values—social, æsthetic and religious—of which it is stripped by those who find it a stumbling-block; (4) the confusion of the question of the *nature* and function of reflective consciousness with the irrelevant psychological matter of the division and specialization of interest.

A Sociological Theory of Knowledge: E. L. SCHAUB.

Though presenting itself as integral, experience likewise manifests perplexing antitheses, both in fact and in worth, in the realm of cognition no less than in those of feeling and volition. Hence distinctions such as those of opinion and knowledge, perception and conception, sense data and categories.

I. *Historical Setting.*—Early empiricism and rationalism were succeeded by Kant's endeavor to show that the various factors of experience must be interpreted as abstractions from a concrete whole, not as separate entities. This led to idealistic theories of knowledge, for which experience is an indissoluble synthesis of existence and meaning. But Kant inextricably combines with the above an attempt to show how experience comes into being. This paved the way for genetic doctrines: empiricism; apriorism; Spencer's media-

tory view; James's explanation of classificatory, logical and mathematical relations as due to spontaneous variations; Bergson's evolutionary apriorism. To safeguard the unique and authoritative character of concepts and categories (as emphasized by apriorism) while yet tracing them to specific origins verifiable by scientific investigation (as attempted by empiricism) is the aim of Durkheim.

II. *Durkheim's Theory of Knowledge*.—Cognitive experience exhibits two mutually irreducible sorts of elements: (1) Sensations, images and general ideas, dependent upon the organism and characterized by flux, subjectivity, and a status merely of *fact*, not of *right*. (2) Concepts, and the most general of the concepts, categories, the permanent to which the variable is related in the act of thinking; characterized by immutability, impersonality, universality, communicability, and authoritativeness. Their origin is the collective mind, which is distinct from individual minds and is *sui generis*. The genesis of the concepts or categories of class, of the hierarchical mode of classification, of totality, space, time, force, cause, and contradiction.

Concepts and categories afford the first intuition of a realm of truth—an order characterized by impersonality, stability, and social acceptance. No category or system of concepts more than approximates to objective validity; yet all are more than merely individual and many are more than merely instrumental or even social in the narrow sense of the term.

III. *Critique*.—The difficulties center about the cleavage between the individual and the collective minds and about the intellectualism which regards minds as consisting of representations. Inadequate recognition of the social and logical aspects of sense perception and of other processes classed as individual; of the extent to which concepts and categories are rooted in instincts; of difficulties involved in the fact that, as compared with social organization, categories are practically, if not absolutely, stable, and connected with the further fact that classification seldom occurs in connection with the realm of spirits and of the beyond in spite of the fact that these are matters of focal significance to the primitive mind. Contradiction between Durkheim's method and his principles. The categories of his description presuppose the categories. Given (1) the characteristics now conceded by numerous psychologists as original, (2) a high degree of plasticity on the part of human nature, and (3) interrelationships with minds as well as with inert objects, and one may account satisfactorily for the rational experience which individuals come to enjoy. Epistemology should take into consideration the relation of mind to mind along with that of mind to its objects.

The Chief Assumptions of Democracy: R. W. SELLARS.

It is not difficult nowadays to pick up books and essays very critical of democracy. In these criticisms we clearly find the swing of the pendulum from a naïve romanticism which filled the democratic movement in its early days. But what we need to-day is an effective idealism which is full of knowledge of actual conditions and social forces.

In its deepest sense, democracy signifies the conviction that every human being deserves respect and consideration. This respect is the ferment which democracy introduces into society. In religious language, the postulate of democracy is, that all men are brethren and that God is the common father. The eighteenth century proclaimed its democratic perceptions in the doctrine of inalienable rights.

But these guiding ideas have been largely individualistic. What have been the actual principles at work in our institutional life? First of all, we must remember that the democratic movement is the social reality. And the democratic movement has faced in two directions. It has denied the type of social organization previously dominant and it has suggested principles of its own. Besides there has always been a right and a left wing to the movement. We, in America, have been far more familiar with the right, liberal wing than with the left, radical wing.

The three important aspects of society are the political, the economic and the social. In each of these dimensions the assumptions of society have varied far more than we ordinarily realize. The first attitude of democracy was individualistic and defensive. It stressed rights rather than creation. It was not very constructive or forward-looking. This comes out in such phrases as the "consent of the governed" and "individual rights." In the economic sphere, we have *laissez-faire* rather than group-planning. In social affairs, imitation and convention rather than activity and independence of spirit.

A new spirit seems now abroad, and democracy is more aware of actual conditions and more purposive. The good life is the goal being set, and the social conditions favoring its approximation are being carefully scrutinized. It is clear, then, that the assumptions of democracy change radically from age to age.

The Ethical Import of Nationalism: E. L. HINMAN.

Recognizing the force of nationalism in modern days, the question presses concerning its philosophical interpretation. Urged that one's definition of the essence of nationalism will depend upon his philosophy; that nationalism as conceived in the context of a realistic philosophy is a terrific force for evil, but that as leavened by the

spirit of a broad idealism it is one of the most valuable of constructive influences. This influence should be seized upon and guided by the representatives of philosophy. But it has been exploited hitherto chiefly by the historians, whose discernment of the vital ideals of civilization has been inadequate. And the result has been tragic.

Analysis of Professor Ramsay Muir's conception. Inadequate—tends to level downwards. Prevalence of cruder and more realistic elements in popular nationalism and jingoism. Relevancy of strictures by Veblen and Krehbiel. But these outrage nationalism rather than interpret it. Must engage with and express higher idealism of nationalistic consciousness. Study of Mazzini, as pointing the way to this service.

The Concept of State Power: G. H. SABINE.

The state has traditionally been conceived for juristic purposes as a unified power, or legal personality, having underived, and possibly unlimited, right to issue commands to its subjects or political inferiors. Such commands of a political superior are law, and law derives its binding force from the political superiority of the will which issues it.

This conception is derived historically from the political conditions which prevailed in the period which brought the state into existence. The state was created by the rise of royal power to a position of dominance over the feudal nobility or certain corporations within the kingdom and of independence as against the Church and the Holy Roman Empire. Sovereign power meant in the first instance the personal power of the king to make and enforce law against all persons or associations within his domain. Such power was not incorrectly described as underived, unified, and absolute.

The rise of constitutional monarchy brought into being the doctrine that this absolute power inheres not in the king, but in the people, but the principle that absolute power is the source of law remained unchanged. But the concept now lacked juristic clarity because the people are not an organized law-making institution. With the growth of constitutional limitations, the law-making power of the state ceased to be concentrated in any specific agency of the government and the attempts of political science to indicate the body in which sovereign power resides were futile. The federal states presented especially complex examples of political organization. The rationalistic method of political science, however, clung to the belief that certain essential powers of the state might be derived by a logical elaboration of the concept of the state's power, and the political tendency toward centralization of authority strengthened this belief.

In fact, however, political practise does not justify the theory that any specific powers are essential to the state nor is there much unity in the powers which a given state exercises. Modern states have taken over a varied assortment of activities having no obvious unity beyond the fact that they are carried on by agencies of government. Moreover, the powers exercised by the state do not represent any specific public interest, since public interest may be just as strong in many activities conducted by private agencies. It is a question of policy whether a socially important activity can best be conducted by the one means or the other. In either case, however, the activity is protected and regulated by law.

The prevailing tendency of constitutional government has been to make every agency of government subject to law and with some exceptions such agencies are legally responsible for their actions as fully as private persons or corporations. This indicates the complete inappropriateness of defining law as the will of the state embodied in commands to political inferiors.

International Punishment: A. P. BROGAN.

There is an almost unworked field in the study of international punishment. The task of philosophy here is to formulate the methods, principles, and rules for the determination of justice in the punishment of nations.

This study should not be condemned as self-contradictory on the argument that punishment originally occurs only within one group. Men are now seeking for just ways of dealing with wrong-doing between nations. This is our problem, call it what you will.

If philosophy is to be helpful for this problem, it must be philosophy as the study of values rather than as metaphysics or epistemology or theology. Discussions about determinism, about the general will, about the absolute, would not benefit our problem even if agreement could be reached; and agreement can not be reached.

What we need is a common platform for ethical investigation. The essentials of this platform (teleology, universalism, meliorism, and experimentalism) could quickly be secured by serious cooperation. The questions about which thinkers are likely to remain in essential disagreement are those parts of ethical theory not necessary as foundations for our study.

On this common platform a theory of international ethics must be elaborated, as the guide and standard for international law and for international associations. A principal part of this ethics will be the justice of international punishment.

The determination of right and justice in this connection is a

problem for the student of ethical philosophy. But it would be folly for the philosopher to pretend to deal with the entire problem of international punishment. There is need of specialization on the part of the philosopher, and there is equal need of cooperation with the students of law, government, history, social psychology, and similar fields. The task of the philosopher is to study the values involved.

A Neglected Aspect of Hume's Ethical Theory: F. C. SHARP.

Hume finds the source of the moral judgment in the affective side of man's nature. The ethicists of the rationalistic school have always asserted that the logical consequence of such a view is ethical subjectivism. Many of the members of the affectivistic school, such as A. E. Taylor and Westermarck, freely admit the truth of this contention.

The paper attempts to show how Hume, in defending his theory against certain objections (which, however, had nothing to do with subjectivism) was led to recognize that the moral judgment is something more than an expression of the passing feelings of the moment. The moral judgment, he saw, does not represent the feelings aroused in me by the fact that one of the parties of the situation happens to be an acquaintance, a friend, or myself; that I happen to have witnessed the incident, or that the incident took place yesterday instead of two thousand years ago. The moral judgment represents my feelings with regard to conduct when I have abstracted from my accidental relations to the parties concerned; it is the voice of the impersonal or (somewhat less accurately) the impartial spectator.

When this fact is recognized, the distinction made in every-day life between "correct" and "incorrect" moral judgments is at once justified. For judgments in which I do not succeed in taking the impersonal attitude are not moral judgments in the proper sense of the term, and can therefore only be called "incorrect," or, better, invalid. Hume never really saw the bearing of these facts upon the general problem of the existence of a universally valid moral code. The great majority of later ethicists have ignored the facts themselves completely. They are, however, of the first importance in discussing the question: What are the causes of the variations in moral judgments? Such a discussion may perhaps lead to the conclusion that when these invalid members are removed from the system of our moral judgments the remainder will form a single harmonious code which will thus represent the code of the entire race. If so we shall have an ethical theory based upon desires and their attendant feelings which is justified in asserting the existence of a moral code valid for mankind as a whole.

A Reversal of Perspective in Ethical Theory: H. W. STUART.

(To be published in full in an early number of the *Philosophical Review*.)

The Basis of Human Association: H. W. WRIGHT.²

The basis of human association is personal communication carried on through discussion, cooperation and emotional concord. Discussion is made possible by the fact that the ends which men choose among are commonly intelligible. An end is a permanent possibility of realization for a subject or self; such a self is essentially social, for it maintains its personal identity by opposing to the shifting play of animal sentience an order of definable objects that is assumed to be real for all other selves as well. Cooperation depends upon the fact that the satisfaction which human individuals seek from the realization of objects as ends is a function of their comprehensiveness, and this, since it is based upon their intelligible character, is assumed to hold for all men equally. The possibility of an agreement in purpose among men is therefore created, an agreement which is favored by the fact that the more comprehensive ends are those which include in their scope the interests of others as well as the self. Emotional concord is made possible by the fact that the feelings which accompany and result from human action spring from the pursuit of commonly intelligible ends concerning whose value there is general agreement. The "Kingdom of Ends" is by nature a social kingdom; the single self in pursuit of an intelligently considered and deliberately chosen end involves the society of selves participating in the realization of common ends. Personal communication as a process has three essential characteristics: first, it is governed by ends that are social and imply the community of selves; second, it gives fullest opportunity for the exercise of individual initiative and inventiveness in the attainment of ends whose value is generally appreciated; and third, it insures from the intercourse of free persons the discovery of new values in the discharge of our common social task.

Group Participation as the Sociological Principle par Excellence: J. E. BOODIN.

It has been customary to explain social evolution and social conduct in terms of certain factors or causes, such as the physical factors, race, instinct, population, custom, *etc.* The thesis of this paper is a reversal of the ordinary method. It is, that instead of trying to account for the group by certain factors, we must understand the

² To be published in full in a later issue of this JOURNAL.

factors in terms of the group—its cumulative tradition and creative life. The real causes or motives must be found in the life history of the individual, as woven into the social network of relations at a specific cross-section of the history of the group. We can not say that this particular condition of the environment or this particular tendency effected such and such results, but we must take account of this condition or tendency as part of an organization of life interests with its social pressure, system of beliefs and scale of values. The particular factors must be regarded as instruments, conditions, raw material for social construction. The process, in other words, must be regarded, not as a mechanical but as a teleological process—the factors having meaning and efficiency only as they enter into the creative synthesis of group realization. We must take account of group participation, not as a mere effect, but as an independent variable, and for sociology the most significant variable. We find that other factors may vary and yet group relations remain the same. And on the other hand we find that group relations may vary while other factors remain the same.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge. A. N. WHITEHEAD. Cambridge University Press. 1919. Pp. xii + 200.

This is a book of real importance, but it is not a book for everybody. There are pages filled with definitions of queer technical terms, and there is no index, but that is not what makes it hard reading. The difficulty lies in the thought. You need some mathematical training to read the book, and you need some acquaintance with the previous writings of the author, or the related writings of Mr. Bertrand Russell. But far more than these, you need a sense of the whole movement of modern physical science, and an imagination undaunted by four-dimensional manifolds interweaving with other four-dimensional manifolds. In short, we have a book here which ought to be read by every philosophy student interested in metaphysics or in the philosophy of nature, but a book which most students of philosophy are not competent to read.

The subject of the enquiry is stated to be "geometry as a physical science," or "how is space rooted in experience?" And its fundamental thesis is that the verifiable data of physical science